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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the concept “career politician.” It seeks to clarify, systematize, and 
measure this ambiguous multi-dimensional concept in order to facilitate testing theories and 
hypotheses associated with it. We argue that career politicians are full-time politicians who 
lack significant experience in the wider world and have other distinguishing attributes for 
which they are both appreciated and criticized. From claims and critiques put forward by 
political scientists, journalists, publics, and politicians, we extract four principal dimensions: 
Strong Commitment, Narrow Occupational Background, Narrow Life Experience, and Strong 
Ambition. These dimensions and their indicators fit Wittgenstein’s family-resemblance 
conceptual structure, which is how we analyze, measure and validate them with data from a 
longitudinal study of British MPs spanning 1971-2016.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The institutionalization and professionalization of legislatures in the second half of the 
twentieth century created politicians who, in Weber’s (1946 [1919]) famous analysis, lived 
“for” politics and also “off” politics. “Career politicians”, as King (1981) termed them, have 
since become a dominant and controversial presence across the liberal democratic world 
(Squire, 1993; Searing, 1994; Norris, 1997; Saalfeld, 1997; Shabad and Slomczynski, 2002; 
Cairney, 2007; Coop and Bittner, 2011; Heuwieser, 2018). Many academics believe such 
politicians are essential for effective governance (Best and Cotta, 2000, pp. 21-22; Shabad 
and Slomczynski, 2002; Fisher, 2014). Others believe their behavior fuels the “anti-politics” 
of national populism and undermines political legitimacy (Wright, 2013a; Allen, 2018; 
Clarke et al., 2018; Savoie, 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019).  
Cumulative research in this field has been greatly impeded, however, by conceptual 
confusion (Allen and Cairney, 2017). Career politicians are often vaguely and inconsistently 
distinguished from “professional politicians,” “careerists” and “the political class.” 
Sometimes these terms are used as synonyms. This paper aims to clarify the career-politician 
concept by identifying its principal dimensions, measuring them, and testing the validity of 
these measures so that they can be used with confidence in empirical research. We eschew 
“classic” concept construction and instead turn to Wittgenstein’s (1953) “family 
resemblance” approach (see Goertz, 2006). We argue that “career politician” is best 
understood as a multi-dimensional concept in which the absence of some characteristics can 
be compensated by the presence of others. 
After reviewing the academic literature and wider political discourse, we extract four 
principal dimensions. Career politicians are associated with strong vocational commitment 
and political ambition. They are also associated with narrow occupational backgrounds and 
limited life experiences, but no particular characteristic seems either necessary or sufficient. 
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From this viewpoint, we move beyond thinking about career politicians in binary terms. The 
dimensions associated with the concept are all continuous variables. We may use typologies 
and prototypes to discuss the subject, but being a career politician is clearly a matter of 
degree.  
Finally, we develop measures of the four dimensions and validate them using a data 
set on British MPs. Career politicians may be found in any established political institution. 
Our focus on the British House of Commons is partly a reflection of the concept’s initial 
association with UK politics (King 1981; Riddell 1996) but primarily a consequence of the 
rich data we have collected. A large number of MPs were interviewed in 1971-1974 and re-
interviewed in 2012-2016.1 The 1970 General Election was a watershed for the rise of full-
time career politicians. MPs were now provided with staffing allowances and other benefits, 
and remunerated sufficiently to enable long-term careers (Norton, 1997, pp. 23-25; Rush and 
Cromwell, 2000, p. 488; Rush, 2001; Jun, 2003; Cairney, 2007; Allen, 2013; Langdon 2015). 
After 1970, these career politicians steadily replaced amateurs and part-timers (Riddell, 1996, 
pp. x-xi, 14). The virtue of our sample is that it includes many examples of each, which 
facilitates comparisons between them.  
Our measures of career politicians draw on the interviews conducted in 1971-1974 
(for convenience we refer to them as 1974). These involved 521 MPs, an 83 percent response 
rate. The face-to-face recorded and transcribed sessions lasted 90 minutes on average, 
ranging from 30 minutes to five hours. They included interviews, at the same response rate, 
with ministers and opposition frontbench spokesmen. All were given written guarantees of 
anonymity. The interviews probed parliamentary careers and psychological characteristics 
embedded in career performances. Respondents completed paper and pencil forms including 
 
1 The 2012-2016 re-interviews provide perspectives on the career-politician concept but are 
not otherwise used in the measures and analyses in this paper. 
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a pre-parliamentary occupational history. For the present paper, we coded and added to this 
data information on MPs’ pre-parliamentary occupations, years of service in the House of 
Commons, retirements and circumstances of these retirements.  
 
THEORETICAL CLAIMS AND POLITICAL CRITIQUES 
Professional politicians were discovered by Weber (1946[1919]) and introduced to 
political scientists as “career politicians” by King (1981). Subsequent academic and popular 
treatments of the subject endorsed many of King’s main points but reworked the term’s focus 
(Rush, 1994, Riddell, 1996; 2001; Paxman, 2002; Oborne, 2007). Over time, the concept 
became increasingly multidimensional.  
To identify the principal dimensions of “career politician,” we apply a research design 
constructed by Goertz (2006). The first step is to examine how the term is used in academic 
and political discourse. The concept’s principal dimensions can then be derived from these 
sources and reconstructed systematically without losing touch with the political worlds in 
which it lives. We approach this task by considering briefly positive and negative claims 
about career politicians.  
Many of the positive claims about career politicians stem from students of legislative 
professionalization, who value committed, full-time politicians for their contributions to good 
governance (Polsby, 1968; Best and Cotta, 2000; King, 2000; Shabad and Slomczynski, 
2002; Borchert, 2003; Borchert and Zeiss, 2003; Mackenzie, 2015).  
For instance, the House of Commons’ performance improved when professionals 
gradually replaced amateurs on the backbenches (King, 1981, p. 280). MPs now work harder 
for their constituents and pay more attention to citizens’ needs and views (Riddell, 1996, p. 
24; 2011, p. 83; Squire, 2007). They also work harder on policy advocacy and oversight of 
the executive (King, 1981, p. 280; Searing, 1994; Norton 1997, pp. 22-23, 27; Saalfeld, 1997, 
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p. 44; Jun, 2003, pp. 168-69; Riddell, 2011, p. 83). They are said to be more assertive and 
independent than their predecessors (Smith, 1978; Rush and Cromwell, 2000, p. 489; Jun, 
2003, p. 176; Allen and Cairney, 2017, p. 20; Heuwieser, 2018, p. 334. C.f. Kam, 2006; 
Hardman, 2018; O’Grady, 2019, p. 549).  
Career politicians are also praised for bringing with them relevant political experience 
(Riddell, 1996, pp. 306-07; Jun, 2003, p. 175; Allen, 2013; 2018, pp. 54, 61; Fisher, 2014; 
Crewe, 2015, pp. 114-115). Many come from political apprenticeships and politically allied 
occupations like public relations, journalism, teaching and academia. They understand arcane 
legislative rules and procedures (Squire, 2007), are disposed toward compromise (Riddell, 
1996, pp. 270-71; Borchert, 2003, 20), and are able to digest information and presumably 
make better political judgments (Squire, 2007).  
Other commentators, however, emphasize career politicians’ lack of extra-political 
interests, knowledge and experience (King, 2015, pp. 71-72). Their predecessors had been 
prominent industrialists, stockbrokers, landlords, successful barristers, leaders in other 
professions, manual workers, and trade union officials. Most career politicians today have not 
had such experience. Some of them, recently branded as “ultra” career politicians, advance 
from political activism at university to become MPs’ researchers, assistants, or think-tank 
staffers, and, soon after being elected themselves, expect preferment and promotion 
(Goplerud, 2015).  
The narrow background of career politicians matters for several reasons. In the first 
place, it encourages middle-class homogeneity and excludes people and perspectives from 
diverse backgrounds (Allen, 2013; 2018; Durose et al., 2013; Abbott, 2014; Heath, 2015; 
King, 2015). It further reduces career politicians’ experiential knowledge of other policy 
areas (Oborne, 2007; King and Crewe, 2014, p. 208; Kettle, 2015). Career politicians also 
have limited life experience in the real world. They lack maturity and judgment (Wright, 
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2013a; Allen and Cairney, 2017; Clarke et al., 2018, pp. 104-05). They have little contextual 
understanding of the lives of ordinary citizens and are said to be “out of touch” (Wright, 
2013a; Crace, 2015; Lamprinakou et al., 2016, p. 208; Allen and Cairney, 2017; Allen and 
Cowley, 2018; Clarke et al., 2018, p. 2).  
Career politicians have also been criticized for their strong ambition and for focusing 
less on the common good (Jackson, 1988; O’Grady, 2019, p. 545). They are Machiavellian 
and single-mindedly devoted to personal advancement (King, 1981, pp. 279, 283-84; Riddell, 
1996, p. 278; Oborne, 2007; Allen and Cairney, 2017, pp. 18-19; Allen, 2018, pp. 36-37; 
Clarke et al., 2018, pp. 88-97). Publics in turn paint them as disingenuous, “not straight 
talkers,” “twisters,” and characters who generally “make promises they don’t keep” 
(Borchert, 2003, pp. 8, 19; Wright, 2013a; Allen and Cairney, 2017, p. 20; Allen, 2018, pp. 
38-39; Clarke et al 2018, pp. 91-93).2  
 
DEFINITIONS 
Many of the positive and negative claims made about “career politicians” have also 
been applied to “the political class” and “professional politicians” (see Allen and Cairney, 
2017; pp. 21-22; Allen 2018, pp. 20-23; Allen and Cowley 2018). This is partly because 
some commentators and researchers use the terms interchangeably, and partly because there 
is no consensus on how to distinguish among them. The inconsistent use of concepts and 
measures in much academic research confounds the comparison of findings (Allen and 
 
2 Many criticisms of career politicians could also apply to politicians in general, although a 
marked feature of the literature and discourse bemoaning politicians in general is a tendency 
to ascribe criticisms of politicians to the proliferation of career politician. There is some 
evidence to suggest that citizens recognize the relevant experience of candidates who possess 
a political background (Campbell and Cowley 2014). But while citizens talk a good deal 
about “career politicians,” there is, as yet, no systematic study of how clearly citizens 
distinguish between career- and non-career politicians. 
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Cairney, 2017). Hence, before we extract the concept’s principal dimensions and measure 
them, it is necessary to clarify who career politicians are. 
Distinguishing career politicians from the political class is relatively straightforward. 
Allen and Cowley (2018, p. 222) use “political class” to refer to an unrepresentative group of 
elected politicians. Others define it more broadly to include MPs’ assistants, lobbyists, 
political consultants and staff in political parties and policy institutes (Jun 2003, p. 170), 
executive appointees and judges, (Borchert, 2003, pp. 5-6, 16), and even political journalists 
(Oborne 2007). Whether drawn more widely or narrowly, the idea of a political class is 
nonetheless distinct from the idea of both career and professional politicians because it refers 
to an aggregation of disparate individuals who are likely to have different roles, drives, and 
motives.  
The relationship between professional politicians and career politicians is less clear-
cut. Allen and Cowley (2018) define “professional politicians” as those who enter legislatures 
from occupations in the political world. Both Borchert (2003) and Jun (2003) classify 
professional politicians as a sub-set of the political class, as individuals who perform their 
roles full-time. Complete commitment to their roles also distinguishes them from their 
amateur and part-time predecessors. This is how they are characterized in traditional studies 
of professionalization and institutionalization (Polsby, 1968; King, 1981, pp. 277-78; 
Matthews, 1984; Squire, 1993; Best and Cotta, 2000; Rush and Cromwell, 2000, p. 490; 
Borchert and Zeiss, 2003; Cairney, 2007). 
The next step requires some context. The term professional politician was used in 
studies of legislative professionalization long before the rise of “career politicians,” which 
most observers backdate to the 1970s. King (1981) substituted this new term for professional 
politician in an essay on the changing profile of British politicians. Just like the professional 
politician in institutionalization and professionalization studies, King’s (1981, pp. 250-51) 
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career politician was committed to and aspired to be in politics full-time. But beginning with 
Riddell’s (1996) influential book 15 years later, three important dimensions were added, two 
of which are often regarded as more important than commitment. Since Riddell, this more 
multifaceted conceptualization of “career politician” has become increasingly commonplace 
in academic and public discourse.  
Since the key marker for professional politicians is that they are full-time, all 
professional politicians must be counted as at least partial career politicians because they 
share the career politician’s commitment attribute. To the extent that some professional 
politicians also satisfy one or more of the three newer definitional dimensions, they become 
stronger career politicians (career politician is a continuous variable) and are more likely to 
be so branded by researchers, commentators and members of the public (Squire, 2007). Many 
people use the terms interchangeably. While this may be imprecise, it is not entirely 
incorrect.  
 
THE CAREER POLITICIAN: FOUR FUNDAMENTAL DIMENSIONS 
Applying Goertz’s (2006) principles of concept formation, we treat “career politician” 
as a multidimensional concept whose components must be justified by normative claims 
about their political importance, and causal claims about their consequences. From our 
review of the literature and political discourse, four dimensions stand out: Strong 
Commitment, Narrow Occupational Background, Narrow Life Experience, and Strong 
Ambition.  
These dimensions can then be considered within a three-level framework (Goertz, 
2006, pp. 6-7, 60). The “Basic Level”, the first column in Figure 1, is the concept itself – 
career politician – used for making theoretical and empirical claims about consequences. The 
“Secondary Level”, the second column, identifies the concept’s fundamental dimensions. The 
10 
 
“Indicator Level”, the third column, lists each dimension’s operationalizations. The basic and 
secondary levels are sufficiently abstract to enable theory-building in comparative analysis. 
The indicator level can accommodate cross-national differences in accessible data (Goertz, 
2006, p. 64). Our data, as noted in the introduction, come from interviews with British MPs 
in the 1970s, supplemented with information on their pre-parliamentary occupations and 
subsequent careers, and re-interviews four decades later. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
COMMITMENT 
During the re-interviews, we asked a former minister: “What does the phrase ‘career 
politician’ mean to you?” In his mind it was simple: “It means someone who thinks politics is 
their life.” When King (1981) coined the term that is exactly what he meant too.3 Career 
politicians do not regard politics as a short-term interlude in varied careers (Jun, 2003, p. 
174). Politics is their occupation and preoccupation, their vocation, as Weber saw it (King, 
1981, pp. 250-55; Riddell, 1996, p. 7; Oborne, 2007, p. 326). Career politicians are 
committed to politics as a full-time, lifetime occupation (Riddell, 1996, pp. 2-7). They work 
very hard and for very long hours. They rule out voluntary retirements to pursue other careers 
(King, 1981, pp. 250-55). 
In Table 1 below, we present measures for three aspects of Commitment: duration, 
intensity, and revocability. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3 Most discussions of career politicians focus on members of legislatures, but career 
politicians are found in other institutions as well, for example, political parties and local 
governments.  
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Since nearly all the 1974 interviewees were either deceased, retired, or on the cusp of 
retirement by 2016, it is possible to use behavioral indicators across their entire careers to 
assess degrees of commitment. Duration is measured by the total number of years each MP 
served in the House of Commons. It distinguishes those for whom politics has actually been a 
lifetime occupation and serves as a proxy for vocational tenacity, a personal characteristic 
associated with commitment as a “calling.” Table 1 shows that there is a wide range of 
duration: 9 percent left in ten or fewer years, and nearly one out of four didn’t stay beyond 
fifteen, not enough for a lifetime’s vocation, which might require twenty-five years or more - 
one could enter around age forty and retire at sixty-five or later still, which 42 percent did.4  
Intensity of commitment is measured by total time spent on parliamentary activities 
inside and outside Westminster. This information was obtained on a form completed by the 
1974 interviewees. Time spent inside the House of Commons (“during a typical week when 
the House is in session”) included specific estimates for time in standing and select 
committees, in the Chamber, on constituency work, party meetings, and other (lobby, dining 
room, etc.). Time spent outside the House was divided into constituency and party work, and 
other work, which for ministers included their long hours in Whitehall. The modal estimate 
 
4 Duration focuses directly on the structure of the career but not directly on the psychology of 
commitment, which was also of upmost importance to King (1981) and Riddell (1996). Some 
MPs might start out with the intention to pursue politics as a lifetime career, but then, through 
no fault of their own, lose their seats. Still, we would argue that the more that politics actually 
is a lifetime occupational experience for an MP, the more likely the MP is to understand it as 
a vocation, in Weber’s terms, as a commitment with a “calling.” Although duration 
concentrates on structure, it is also a proxy for vocational tenacity, a key psychological aspect 
of commitment. For example, most of those who lost their seats did not try to attain others, 
while some of those with the longest tenure did lose their seats at some point and then sought 
and attained others. To investigate duration’s efficacy, we used our two validity tests, which 
showed that duration is the strongest of the three commitment measures, stronger even than 
revocability (rejection of voluntary retirement), which King regarded as a litmus test for 
Strong Commitment. Moreover, duration is the only one of the three commitment measures 
that can be used in cross-national, non-interview research.  
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for total time engaged with the career in a typical week was between 51 and 60 hours. Nine 
percent reported 40 hours or less, as in a 9-5 job, while nearly half put their estimate at 60 
hours or more, which is what some academics who see their own careers as vocations might 
claim. 
Revocability of commitment is measured by two questions in the 1974 interviews: 
“How likely is it that you might voluntarily retire from Parliament?”, and, “What would be 
the reasons for this?” This measure assesses their intentions at the time of the interviews and 
whether alternative careers were at least considered as possibilities.5 Sixty-two percent of 
respondents were not planning voluntary retirements. We also coded a behavioral measure, 
which could be used where interview data are not available, of what these MPs actually did 
over the ensuing decades.6 In the end, four out of five stayed the course. Although there is a 
good deal of measurement error in the behavioral indicator, it nevertheless has a significant 
correlation (at the 0.05 level) with MPs’ 1974 responses to the interview questions.  
OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND 
While King (1981) regarded Strong Commitment as the paramount defining attribute 
of a career politician, other political scientists and commentators have emphasized a general 
“lack of real-world experience” (Riddell, 1996). During recent decades attention has 
 
5 Henn (2018) believes commitment is best measured in this way, but it can also be measured 
by inference from behavioral indicators such as unsuccessfully contesting seats before first 
election, or trying to stand again after losing an election. 
6 MPs were coded as having had a “Revocable Commitment” to their political career if they 
(a) Announced their voluntary retirement before age 51 at final exit, thus giving themselves 
time for another career, or (b) By the circumstances of their exit: election defeat, de-selection, 
or constituency abolished before age 51 – and no attempt to seek or achieve new 
nominations. By contrast, we took as evidence of an “Irrevocable Commitment,” which best 
fits the image of politics as a vocation, meeting any one of the following criteria: (a) No early 
retirement: announced voluntary retirement after age 55 at final exit; (b) Involuntary early 
retirement: final exit due to death or illness; (c) Circumstances of exit: election defeat, de-
selection, or constituency abolished before age 51– and sought but failed to achieve a new 
nomination; (d) Election defeat, de-selection, constituency abolished – after age 60 at final 
exit. 
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increasingly focused on pre-parliamentary occupational backgrounds for which there is often 
readily available data.  
Narrow Occupational Background relates to a particular part of experience in the 
wider world. What do politicians who have held “real jobs” learn through their occupational 
experiences about the everyday lives of ordinary citizens? In most cases, not much. But they 
do acquire sectoral policy expertise, and they may develop valuable management experience. 
Thus, former miners who go into politics will bring with them knowledge about the mining 
industry, while soldiers, farmers, and business people will bring with them knowledge about 
the armed forces, farming, and business respectively. 
Because they have not held such “real jobs,” career politicians are said to lack 
practical, common-sense, experiential knowledge about policy areas (Oborne, 2007; King 
and Crewe, 2014, p. 208; Kettle, 2015). They are poorly equipped, it is said, to evaluate 
legislation or, as ministers, to test the advice of civil servants (Groves, 2012; Allen, 2018; 
Hardman, 2018, p. xiv; Savoie, 2018). Furthermore, lack of significant managerial experience 
in commerce or industry impairs the career politician’s preparation for ministerial office. 
They just don’t “know how to run things” (Cavendish, 2010).  
Pre-Parliamentary Career is our first indicator of Narrow Occupational Background. 
In 1974 MPs were asked to correct an occupational history form listing their pre-
parliamentary occupations. We began with these corrected forms and worked with more 
recent published sources to ascertain their post-education careers.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 2 we list MPs’ predominant pre-parliamentary occupations and the number 
of MPs who pursued each. Following Cairney’s (2007) widely-used classifications, these 
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occupations are divided into three groups: Political (Cairney’s “Instrumental”), Politically 
Conscious (Cairney’s “Brokerage”) and Non-Political (Cairney’s “Proper Jobs”).  
Political Occupations are those directly related to politics like assistant to an MP, a 
lobbyist, a party worker or a researcher at party offices. Politically Conscious Occupations 
are not directly political, but are close to politics and provide perspectives, training and 
windows into political careers (Jun, 2003, p. 173). Many of their practitioners are in touch 
with political worlds or follow regularly developments in them. These include occupations 
like trade-union official, public relations, journalism and barrister. Finally, Non-Political 
Occupations cover a wide variety of “real jobs” in sectors where most “ordinary people” 
work: corporations, small businesses, engineering, clerical work, construction, mining or 
farming.  
In 1974, politicians who had pursued only Political Occupations were 4.8 percent of 
the sample. Adding the intermediate Politically Conscious category produces a total of 47 
percent. Finally, MPs with Non-Political backgrounds are 52 percent. 
Years in Pre-Parliamentary Career is our second indicator of Narrow Occupational 
Background. For this measure, we simply aggregated the number of years that MPs in our 
sample had spent working in their predominant pre-parliamentary career. As Table 3 shows, 
just under one-in-ten MPs had spent up to five years in their predominant career, while just 
over one-in-three had accumulated sixteen years’ experience or more. The majority of MPs 
(just over 54 percent) had spent between six and fifteen years in their predominant pre-
parliamentary career.  
These measures refine and strengthen the data on predominant occupations.  The 
more years that MPs have spent in their predominant pre-parliamentary career, the more 
likely they are to bring into Parliament substantial experiential, common-sense knowledge of 
that policy sector, and, quite often, serious managerial experience. 
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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
GENERAL LIFE EXPERIENCE  
To many citizens, being a career politician is synonymous with being “out of touch.” 
Career politicians are allegedly unaware of the difficulties and challenges in citizens’ 
everyday lives because they lack familiarity with citizens’ significant social, economic, and 
personal life experiences (Wright, 2013a, pp. 451; Clarke et al., 2018, pp. 104-07, 204-07).  
Many people expect to see in their politicians something like Aristotle’s (1925) 
“practical wisdom,” a leadership trait that enables political leaders to comprehend and pursue 
the well-being of ordinary people and the political community, a leadership trait learned 
through decades of life experiences. As a former British MP, Tony Wright (2013a, p. 452), 
observed about career politicians:  
They are certainly clever… but this does not make them wise. Nor does it compensate 
for a deficiency of experience of other walks and conditions of life that might inform 
their political judgments. When people say they think politicians are ‘out of touch’, 
these are the sort of considerations they have in mind. 
Before the 1970s, many politicians did not enter parliament till middle age, having 
experienced decades of adult life in “the real world.” Contemporary career politicians, by 
contrast, enter earlier (Jun, 2003, p. 174). Since national politics is no longer part-time, 
significant life experiences beyond the “political bubble” must be absorbed before politicians 
enter parliament (King, 2015, pp. 71-72).  
Today’s career politicians have not done so, and yet expect to rise quickly to 
ministerial office (Allen, 2013). Their growing numbers have created concerns that 
governments are being run by unseasoned young adults (Clarke et al., 2018, pp. 206-10). 
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TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
For a proxy indicator we use age at first entry to the House of Commons, as in Table 
4, which measures the opportunity for having shared or encountered significant life 
experiences in the wider world beyond politics.7 Ten percent of respondents in the 1974 
sample entered the House when they were age 30 or younger. If we take age 35 as the marker 
for early entry, the numbers rise to 32 percent.  
Because the career-politician concept’s dimensions overlap in academic and public 
discourse, some overlap among indicators is unavoidable, and therefore some theoretically-
justified “double-counting” is required. For example, many politicians who enter in middle 
age with plenty of life experience and having had “proper jobs” are nevertheless regarded as 
career politicians because they are deeply committed to the career and have very strong 
ambition. Classic career politicians who enter parliament early with similarly strong 
ambitions and commitments should, in light of their lack of non-political occupational and 
general life experiences, score higher on any summary index.  
AMBITION 
Characterizations of career politicians also emphasize their sometimes excessive 
ambition (King, 2000; Rush, 2001, pp. 135-37). Career politicians are said to stand out by the 
strength of their desire for power and fame (King, 1981, p, 282; White, 1983; Oborne, 2007, 
p. 33; Goplerud, 2015; O’Grady 2019, p. 551; Riddell, 1996, p. 28; Allen and Cowley, 2018). 
This single-minded motivation travels well cross-nationally because many career politicians 
share a vulnerability: if they lose office in middle age, they may have few other skills with 
 
7 Age-of-entry has been used in several studies (Kam, 2006; Henn, 2018; O’Grady, 2019), 
and it does pass the validation tests below, but it needs to be replaced where possible with 
more direct and better focused measures. 
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which to pursue alternative careers offering comparable status or even income (McAllister, 
1997, p. 20; Wessels, 1997, pp. 76-77; Roberts, 2017; C.f. Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). 
Because career politicians are so driven by ambition, they concentrate on the game of 
politics (Wright, 2013a, p. 449; Sieberer and Müller, 2017). They want to make a mark to 
advance their careers. They want laws enacted quickly, push for immediate results, take 
short-term perspectives and neglect underlying problems (King and Crewe, 2014). Moreover, 
they have inadequate public-service orientations, for their strong ambitions lead them to “see 
politics as a career move rather than a call to public service” (Blears, 2008).  
Data on the desire for office are available from transcribed answers to two questions 
in the 1974 interviews (Table 5). The first question was: “And finally, your own plans? Are 
there any further positions in the House that you would like to seek sometime in the future? If 
‘Yes,’ and position is left unspecified, then ‘What position might this be?’” The next question 
was: “What would you say are your chances of achieving (highest position mentioned)?”  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
These were non-attribution interviews with written guarantees, conducted at a time 
when non-attribution was taken very seriously. Some respondents were reserved, but most 
seemed to answer frankly.8  
Strength of Desire for Further Positions. In response to the first question, nearly all 
those desiring further positions, i.e. those we judge to be career politicians to some extent, 
specified posts ranging from whips to cabinet ministers. On the basis of these discussions, 
 
8 Macdonald (1987) has shown that the measures predict, strongly and consistently, 
promotions from the backbenches to ministerial positions. They are also significantly related 
to attitudes and behaviors that would be expected of ambitious backbenchers (Searing, 1994). 
These findings support the measures’ validity.  
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strength of desire was coded from “Absolutely not” to “Very strong.” The last of these 
categories included respondents who said they would leave the Commons if a position was 
not forthcoming, a mindset associated with “ultra” career politicians. Those whose self-
reported ambitions ran from “No” to “Weak” were further coded for the reasons behind their 
static ambition: involuntary (age, expects to lose seat, leader would never appoint me) and 
voluntary (other stronger commitments to family, business or constituents). Both provided 
the basis for the summary code of strength of desire for further position presented in the 
table. Thirty-four percent expressed strong or very strong desires for further positions, with 
career politicians presumably among them. 
Likelihood of Achieving Further Position. For excessive ambition, responses to the 
second question are instructive: those who believe their chances of achieving further 
positions are very good or even fairly good (18 percent) will, according to Schlesinger’s 
(1966) ambition theory, be more determined than those who want further positions but see 
their chances as uncertain, very small or negligible (33 percent) (see also Sieberer and 
Müller, 2017). At the very least, responses to this second question help weed out those who 
are less serious about promotion.  
From the political-science literature and political discourse about career politicians, 
we have now extracted four fundamental dimensions: Strong Commitment, Narrow 
Occupational Background, Narrow Life Experience, and Strong Ambition, and eight 
indicators of these dimensions. Now we consider how to handle them. 
 
CAREER POLITICIAN: A FAMILY RESEMBLANCE CONCEPT 
The classic approach to defining concepts relies upon necessary and sufficient 
conditions (Goertz, 2006). Each of the concept’s dimensions must be necessary for the 
concept’s definition, all of them together being sufficient to define the concept. Not many 
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social-science concept definitions fully meet these stringent criteria. But “career politician” is 
a worse fit than most. It has been stretched (Sartori, 1970) to cover an ever-wider variety of 
cases, while the spotlight has shifted from one definitional dimension to another.  
The consequence of decades of thinking with exemplars and conceptual stretching is 
that none of the concept’s four dimensions is absolutely necessary to identify a career 
politician, which violates the key requirement for classic concept definitions. Each dimension 
has notable exceptions, i.e. individuals who do not fit its criterion but who most observers 
would recognize as career politicians because they display one or more of the other 
dimensions. 
Let us consider examples:  
Dimension 1: Commitment: Everyone recognizes early-entry, “ultra” career 
politicians as members of the conceptual family (Kam, 2006; Goplerud, 2015; Henn, 2018; 
Heuwieser, 2018; O’Grady, 2019), but it is not clear they have long-term commitments to 
their parliamentary careers (Dimension 1). If they do not rise quickly or, having risen, doubt 
their opportunities for further preferment, they may leave politics to pursue careers in other 
fields (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). Prominent examples in British politics include David 
Cameron, George Osborne, Nick Clegg, and David Miliband: “Here today, gone tomorrow 
politicians,” as a 2016 re-interviewee put it. Nevertheless, they were recognized as career 
politicians because they lacked occupational and life experiences and displayed very strong 
ambitions for office.  
Dimensions 2 and 3: Lack of Occupational and Life Experience in the Wider World: 
There are plenty of examples in Britain of MPs—figures like Cecil Parkinson, Norman 
Tebbitt, Vince Cable and Chris Huhne—who are recognized as career politicians but who 
entered Parliament after age 40 and had significant occupational and general life experiences 
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outside politics. Despite not satisfying Dimensions 2 and 3, they are seen as career politicians 
because they fit the profiles for commitment and strong ambition.  
Dimension 4: Strong Ambition: Many professional politicians lack strong ambitions 
for ministerial office (Dimension 4) and yet are counted as career politicians because they 
work as full-time “constituency members” and “policy advocates” (Searing, 1994) and are in 
politics for the long haul. The Labour MPs Dennis Skinner and Tam Dalyell are career 
politicians because of robust commitments to their parliamentary careers. A limited number 
also enter early without much experience in the wider world (Dimensions 2 and 3). 
In sum, “career politician” does not fit the requirements of classic concepts: none of 
its four fundamental dimensions seems absolutely necessary to the categorization. How then 
can we measure the concept and identify career politicians systematically?  
Actually, there is “more or less consensus” on recognizing career politicians when we 
see them, but it is difficult to understand where this “more or less consensus” comes from. 
We suggest it comes from intuitive applications of Wittgenstein’s (1953) “family 
resemblance” structure to the concept.  
The key difference between classic and family-resemblance concepts is 
substitutability: necessary conditions do not have substitutes in classic concepts, but the 
absence of some conditions can be compensated for by the presence of others in family-
resemblance concepts (Goertz, 2006, p. 45). All that is required is reaching the point of 
sufficient resemblance to recognize a case as part of the conceptual family. 
There may be no attribute that all members of the category share. Instead, one can 
focus on single attributes or on different combinations of attributes, as we intuitively do when 
recognizing members of families by different combinations of key features like hair color, 
body type, facial structure, gait, or skin tone (Collier and Mahon, 1993). For example, we 
may recognize person A as a member of family Q by her possession of three characteristics 
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out of four: 1, 2 and 3, but not 4. But we may also recognize person B as a member of this 
same family Q by her possession of any two, or even one, of characteristics 1, 2, 3 and 4. In 
other words, neither characteristic 1, 2, 3 nor 4 is absolutely necessary to establish 
membership of family Q, because different sub-sets of these characteristics may be sufficient 
(Goertz, 2006).  
The strength of the family-resemblance structure is that secondary conceptual levels 
(see Figure 1) can, with some substitutability, enable theory building in comparative analysis, 
while further substitutability at the indicator level can accommodate cross-national 
differences in available data (Goertz, 2006, p. 64). This structure also keeps the career 
politician concept close to its usage in political discourse, which protects its political 
significance and facilitates explanation. 
RE-CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT FROM THE DIMENSIONS 
The key to using the career-politician dimensions is that (a) Most political scientists 
and commentators would likely consider all four relevant, even if they themselves focus on 
only one or two, and (b) Even though many treat the classification as a binary choice, we are 
in fact dealing with a continuous variable. Any one dimension may be sufficient to recognize 
whether or not person A is a member of career-politician conceptual family Q. But to 
measure how much of a career politician person A is, it is desirable to utilize as many 
dimensions as possible.  
We have therefore integrated all four dimensions into a single index, which is 
summarized in on-line Appendix Table 1. By using more information than most political 
scientists and commentators, we integrate their collective understandings and improve the 
validity of our measures 
One problem with creating aggregate-level indices is that not all components are 
measured on the same scale. In our case, the challenge consists of adding together continuous 
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(e.g. age of entry to parliament), ordinal (e.g. strength of ambition for office), and categorical 
(e.g. type of pre-parliamentary occupation) variables. 
To construct a composite index using the career-politician dimensions, we begin by 
standardizing and adding together each constituent measure for each dimension. For the 
Strong Commitment dimension, for example, we apply this procedure to the duration, 
intensity and revocability indicators. We again standardize the composite measure to create 
our final index for this dimension. This step ensures that the overall index remains centered at 
zero, measuring the number of standard deviations that each politician deviates from that 
mean. We thereby obtain the following standardized score for each MP’s commitment: 
𝑥[𝑖]𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒 (
𝑥[𝑖]𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 − 𝑥𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝜎𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
+
𝑥[𝑖]ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 − 𝑥ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝜎ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
+
𝑥[𝑖]𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 − 𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒
𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒
 ) 
 
We apply the same strategy to the Narrow Occupational Background, Narrow Life 
Experience, and Strong Ambition dimensions. 
 
COMPOSITE CAREER-POLITICIAN INDEX 
We used the same basic approach to build our overall composite career politician 
index, which is the standardized sum of our four-dimensional indices. The standardized 
overall composite index is thus defined as: 
𝑥[𝑖]𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑥[𝑖]𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑥[𝑖]𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑥[𝑖]𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑥[𝑖]𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 Note that this approach gives each of the four dimensions an equal impact on our final 
composite index scores. Some might argue that equal weights are an inappropriate modeling 
choice, because recent studies have tended to place a greater emphasis on career politicians’ 
occupational backgrounds and life experiences over their commitment and ambition (Henn, 
2018; Heuwieser, 2018; O’Grady, 2018). It is difficult, however, to determine exactly how to 
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weight the dimensions. As an exploratory robustness check, we made qualitative judgments 
to weight them in a parallel measure that can be found in the on-line Appendix. As a further 
robustness check, we extracted the first principal component (1st PC) from our eight 
indicator-level measures and used its dimension weights as an alternative to our unweighted 
composite career-politician index. In validations matching those reported below and reported 
in the on-line Appendix, both robustness checks produced strikingly similar results to those 
with our “agnostic” unweighted composite career-politician index. 
VALIDITY TESTS  
Recent quantitative investigations use occupational background and age at entry as 
indicators of “career politician” (Kam, 2006; Goplerud, 2015; Henn, 2018; Heuwieser, 2018; 
O’Grady, 2018) despite some uncertainty about their validity (Heuwieser, 2018, pp. 316; 
320-21). We report validity tests for these two indicator dimensions and for the other two we 
use to measure the concept.  
As a first validity test of each dimension, we compare the standardized scores for MPs 
who served as ministers and those who remained on the backbenches. If the indicators work 
as expected, scores for ministers should be consistently higher, as it is well-established that 
ministers are more likely to be career politicians than are backbenchers (Koop and Bittner, 
2011; Cowley, 2012; Allen, 2013; Goplerud, 2015; Allen and Cairney, 2017, p. 23). In 
practice, this test is even more demanding than it first appears. Those counted as ministers 
embrace everyone in our sample who held ministerial office, including junior ministers who 
had little prospect for further advancement (Searing, 1994), and indifferent career politicians 
who served in pre-1970 governments (King, 2015, pp. 62-63).  
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
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The results summarized in Table 6 are impressive. In each paired comparison, 
ministers show a higher standardized mean score than backbenchers on our standardized 
composite career-politician index and our 1st PC weighted scores, as well as for each separate 
dimension. In each case, the difference is significant at the at the 0.05 level based on our 
obtained t-statistics. The large gap between ministers’ and backbenchers’ Ambition 
standardized mean scores is striking but perhaps not surprising: MPs who became ministers 
are more likely to have desired high office than those who remained on the backbenches. The 
differences for the Commitment, Occupational Background and Life Experience dimensions 
are somewhat smaller but still significant and in line with expectations. 
To assess the magnitude of our obtained differences, recall that the composite indices 
and the four dimensions are measured in terms of standard deviations from a zero-centered 
mean. For normally distributed data, about 34 percent of observations fall within one 
standard deviation above the mean. This fact allows us to assign percentile values capturing 
the share of observations that fall above (and below) our obtained standardized mean scores 
for both ministers and backbenchers. 
Focusing on the composite career-politician index, we fail to reject the null-
hypothesis (p>0.1) in a conventional Shapiro-Wilk test, indicating that this index could have 
been drawn from an approximately normal distribution. We take this, and the approximately 
normal shapes of the density and QQ-plots of our index (shown in the on-line Appendix), as 
evidence that we can apply the above rule to our indicators. 
Substantively, we are thus able to recover approximate percentiles for the mean scores 
of backbenchers and ministers respectively. Based on their standardized mean in the second 
column of Table 6, backbenchers (-0.145) score an average career-politician value at the 44th 
percentile of all MPs. This means that the average career-politician score for backbenchers 
lies above 44 percent and below 56 percent among all MPs. This is to be expected because 
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backbenchers should be a fairly random mix of career and non-career politicians. More 
importantly, the mean score for ministers (0.74) lies at the 77th percentile value on the career-
politician index. This means that the average minister in our sample has a higher career-
politician score than 77 percent of all MPs – strong substantive evidence that the composite 
index accurately measures the career-politician concept. 
Our second validity test focuses on career politicians identified by King (1981; 2015) 
and Riddell (1996; 2011), the most knowledgeable academic and journalistic contributors to 
the subject. Again, this is a demanding test because King’s primary focus on commitment 
meant that he might have excluded those who received low scores on this dimension but high 
scores on the other dimensions. Moreover, there are certainly some career politicians in the 
1974 sample who were not named by King or Riddell and who are therefore included among 
our “Non-Listed Politicians,” i.e. non-career politicians. 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 reports standardized mean scores for the career politicians identified by King 
and Riddell and those who were not identified by either author.9 All the differences in means 
are again significant at the 0.05 level based on our obtained t-statistics. Like the results in 
Table 6, the differences suggest our various dimensions and composite indices capture well 
the degree to which an MP is a career politician. The dimensions that are most widely used 
by other researchers, Occupational Background and Life Experience, perform well, while 
even the weakest performing dimension, Commitment, still produces significant differences. 
 
9 It is not a problem if King and Riddell were inconsistent in their use of “professional 
politician” and “career politician”. Professional politicians belong in our measure because all 
of them at least score on commitment, one of the four dimensions, and many will score on 
others as well. 
26 
 
Crucially, this dimension adds valuable information to our combined career-politician index, 
which again outperforms each individual dimension. The composite and 1st PC indices again 
produce the largest differences in means between both groups. Moreover, both these 
measures produce an impressive mean score for named career politicians at the 82nd 
percentile of the entire sample. The composite index, in other words, captures more than the 
sum of its component parts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Career politicians are recognized by distinctive attributes for which they are both appreciated 
and criticized in academic and political discourse. From these sources we extracted four 
fundamental dimensions of the career-politician concept: Strong Commitment, Narrow 
Occupational Background, Narrow Life Experience, and Strong Ambition.  
We clarified the concept’s structure and measured its dimensions in order to 
strengthen the foundation for testing theories and hypotheses associated with it. We treated 
“career politician” as a multi-level, multidimensional concept that fits Wittgenstein’s family-
resemblance structure. This structure helps explain why many observers and researchers can 
confidently identify career politicians using only one dimension. Yet, when they do so, they 
may capture sub-types that diverge somewhat from others. For example, professional 
politicians are career politicians, but they may be only partial career politicians because, 
although they have full-time commitments to their careers (one of the concept’s four 
dimensions), they may not share the other three dimensions. To the extent that they do, they 
are more complete career politicians; to the extent that they do not, they constitute a sub-type 
With interview data, supplemented with information on pre-parliamentary 
occupations and parliamentary career patterns, we measured each of the concept’s four 
dimensions with indicators that passed several validity tests: distinguishing between ministers 
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and backbenchers, and between career politicians (named by two expert observers) and the 
other MPs in the sample. Our composite indices performed best, but each of the four 
dimensions also produced predicted mean scores. Occupational Background and Life 
Experience had more impact than Commitment, the oldest and more traditionally accentuated 
marker. Ambition provided quite strong, but in the King-Riddell validation, it too was 
outdone by Life Experience. Compared to Occupational Background, Life Experience is 
considerably stronger in both validations. Thus, the results demonstrate the importance of the 
two variables (Occupational Background and Life Experience) that are most often used in 
empirical studies.  
The clarified basic concept and its four dimensions are sufficiently abstract to enable 
theory building in comparative analysis, while the indicator level can accommodate 
differences in available data. For cross-national research, we have identified behavioral 
measures that do not require difficult-to-collect interview data: duration and revocability (see 
n. 6) for Commitment; types and length of pre-parliamentary careers for Occupational 
Background; and age at entry for Life Experience. Meanwhile, behavioral measures of 
Ambition can be imputed using Schlesinger’s (1966) theory of ambition and opportunity 
structures. 
Two broader points arise from our clarification and operationalization of the career-
politician concept. The first relates to our use of the family-resemblance structure. There are 
other ambiguous multi-dimensional concepts prominent in everyday political discourse that 
help political actors navigate political developments, and help political scientists explain 
them, but which, like “career politician,” are difficult to define and measure with classic 
principles of concept formation. Wittgenstein’s family-resemblance approach can potentially 
unlock some of them and facilitate their investigation. 
28 
 
The second point relates to the substantive focus of the paper. Political scientists still 
have a great deal to do in terms of examining the impact of career politicians on policy and 
national political life. It is important to examine more fully not just the behavior of career 
politicians but also what it is about career politicians – their commitment, experiences and 
ambition – that affects policy and politics. It is doubly important to investigate the topic in an 
era of national populism, when it has become fashionable in most western democracies to 
regard career politicians as “pariah politicians” (Borchert, 2003, pp. 8, 19). Better empirical 
knowledge can help us evaluate the claims made for and against them and whether active 
measures might be needed to reduce their numbers.  
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Figure 1 – Career Politician Concept 
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Table 1 – The Strong Commitment Dimension 
Duration  
 
Years in the House of 
Commons 
Percentage Frequency  
1-5 5.2 27 
6-10 3.6 19 
11-15 14.2 74 
16-20 19 99 
21-25 16.5 86 
26-30 20.2 105 
31-35 13.2 69 
36-40 5.6 29 
>40 2.5 13 
Total  100.0 521 
   
Intensity  
 
Weekly hours spent on 
parliamentary activities 
Percentage Frequency 
<31 3.1 10 
31-40 6.1 20 
41-50 14.7 48 
51-60 26.7 87 
61-70 22.4 73 
71-80 13.8 45 
>80 13.2 43 
Total 100.0 326 
   
Revocability 
 
Likelihood of voluntary 
retirement from 
Parliament 
Percentage Frequency  
Very likely 11.8 58 
Likely 6.9 34 
Somewhat likely 19.4 95 
Unlikely 3.3 16 
Not before retirement 
age 
42.1 206 
No, never! 16.5 81 
Total  100.0 490 
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Table 2 – Narrow Occupational Background: Pre-Parliamentary Career 
 
Predominant Occupation Percentage Frequency  
   
Political occupations   
1 – Assistant to an MP 0.6 3 
2 – Party worker 2.7 14 
3 – Political researcher 0.9 5 
4 – Full-time local Councilor 0.4 2 
5 – Lobbyist/Political consultant  0.2 1 
Total  4.8 25 
   
Politically conscious occupations    
6 – Trade union official 4.2 22 
7 – Public relations/Advertising 3.1 16 
8 – Journalism/Media  7.3 38 
9 – Barrister/Solicitor  14.6 76 
10 – Lecturer/Teacher 9.8 51 
11 – Civil servant/Charity sector 3.3 17 
Total  42.3 220 
   
Non-political occupations   
12 – Corporation (Director/Executive) 3.6 19 
13 – Small business (Proprietor/Manager) 13.0 68 
14 – Non-executive company director 0.0 0 
15 – Stockbroker/Banker 1.7 9 
16 – Medical doctor 1.5 8 
17 – Architect/Civil engineer pilot 0.4 2 
18 – Actor  0.2 1 
19 – Accountant/Insurance broker 2.7 14 
20 – Industrial scientist/Business consultant 1.1 6 
21 – Engineer/Auctioneer 4.8 25 
22 – Manual worker/Miner/Ship Steward 3.6 19 
23 – Skilled worker/Craftsman 3.8 20 
24 – Clerical worker/Commercial traveler/Nurse 6.1 32 
25 – Military career 1.7 9 
26 – Farmer/Landowner/Forrester 3.4 18 
27 – “Genuine Toffs”/Landed gentry/Aristocrats 3.6 19 
28 – Non-politician’s spouse 0.8 4 
29 – Clergy  0.2 1 
Total  52.2 274 
   
88 – None  0.2 1 
Total  100.0 521 
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Table 3 – Narrow Occupational Background: Years in Pre-Parliamentary Career 
 
Years spent working in 
predominant occupation 
Percentage Frequency  
0-5 9.2 48 
6-10 26.8 139 
11-15 27.6 143 
16-20 16.6 86 
21-25 8.1 42 
26-30 5.8 30 
31-35 4.6 24 
36-40 1.3 7 
   
Total  100.0 519 
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Table 4 – Narrow General Life Experience: Age at Entry to the House of Commons 
 
Age at entry Percentage Frequency  
<31 9.6 50 
31-35 21.9 114 
36-40 27.3 142 
41-45 21.1 110 
46-50 11.9 62 
>50 8.2 43 
   
Total  100.0 521 
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Table 5 – The Strong Ambition Dimension 
 
Strength of desire for further positions 
 
Strength of desire Percentage Frequency  
 
   
Very strong 6.1 30 
Strong 27.6 135 
Moderate 10.2 50 
Weak – Involuntary  19.9 97 
Weak – Voluntary  4.5 22 
No – Involuntary  19.9 97 
No – Voluntary  10.4 51 
Absolutely not! 1.4 7 
   
Total  100.0 489 
   
Likelihood of achieving further positions 
 
Perceived likelihood Percentage Frequency 
   
Very good 5.4 23 
Fairly good 12.7 54 
Modestly optimistic 5.7 24 
Uncertain 18.4 78 
Very small 9.2 39 
No chance 5.0 21 
No further position desired 43.6 185 
   
Total 100.0 424 
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Table 6 – Validity Test 1: T-tests of Standardized Composite Index, Component Indices, and 1st PC Weighted Scores for Ministers and 
Backbenchers 
 
Metric Composite 
Index 
Component indices 1st PC 
Commitment Occupation Experience Ambition 
Standardized Mean 
Scores Backbenchers 
-0.145 -0.071 -0.108 -0.154 -0.175 -0.145 
Standardized Mean 
Scores Ministers 
0.74 0.319 0.387 0.556 0.72 0.743 
T-Statistic -6.862 -2.679 -5.176 -8.11 -8.147 -6.961 
P-Value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
N Backbenchers 230 262 406 408 341 230 
N Ministers 45 58 113 113 83 45 
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Table 7 – Validity Test 2: T-tests of Standardized Composite Index, Component Indices, and 1st PC Weighted Scores for Career 
Politicians Listed by Either King or Riddell  
 
Metric Composite 
Index 
Component indices 1st PC 
Commitment Occupation Experience Ambition 
Standardized Mean 
Scores Non-Listed 
-0.157 -0.072 -0.108 -0.131 -0.111 -0.157 
Standardized Mean 
Scores Listed 
0.897 0.419 0.552 0.672 0.638 0.895 
T-Statistic -8.273 -3.088 -5.972 -9.093 -5.722 -8.071 
P-Value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
N Non-Listed 234 273 434 436 361 234 
N Listed 41 47 85 85 63 41 
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WHAT IS A CAREER POLITICIAN? THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND MEASURES 
 
ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
Standardized Composite Index 
 
Summary table of composite index 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the Standardized Composite Index 
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max Variance Kurtosis Skewness 
-2.57 -0.65 0.025 0 0.68 2.5 1 -0.41 -0.19 
 
 
Cross-Correlation Table between the Standardized Index and the Sub-Categories 
 
Table 2: Cross-Correlations between Individual Dimensions of the Composite Career Politician Index 
 Commitment 
Occupational 
Background 
Life 
experience 
Commitment    
Occupational Background 0.06   
Life experience 0.18* 0.58*  
Ambition 0.17* 0.26* 0.34* 
 * = p<0.05 
Histogram, Density Plot, and QQ-Plot of the Composite Career Politician index 
 
Figure 1: Standardized Composite Career Politician Index Histogram with Superimposed Density Plot 
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Figure 2: Quantile Comparison Plot for the Standardized Composite Career Politician Index 
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R-Output for Shapiro-Wilk test of normality on Composite Career Politician Index: 
 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
Data: Standardized Career Politician Index 
W = 0.99204, p-value = 0.1455, n=275 
 
 
 
 
Weighted Career Politician indices (additional robustness tests) 
 
Table 3: T-test calculations on difference between Ministers and Backbenchers and Listed Career Politicians by either King 
or Riddell for composite indicator under different component weightings. Columns denoted with "x1.5" list the results for a 
composite index whose Occupation and Life Experience components have been multiplied by 1.5. Similarly, "x2" denotes 
tests performed on an index with doubled influence of Occupation and Life Experience. 
Metrics Ministers/Backbenchers 
Listed Career 
Politicians 
Weightings applied to Occupation & 
Experience 
x1.5 x2 x1.5 x2 
Mean Backbenchers -0.137 -0.13 -0.153 -0.149 
Mean Ministers 0.699 0.666 0.873 0.85 
T-Statistic -6.554 -6.254 -8.229 -8.098 
P-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
N Backbenchers/Not listed 230 230 234 234 
N Ministers/ Listed career politician 45 45 41 41 
 
 
 
 
Statistical Detail on principal-component-derived career-politician indicator: 
 
Correlation test between PCA and Standardized Indices 
Pearson's product-moment correlation estimate between standardized composite index and 
PCA-derived score weights (1st dimension) 
 
Correlation: 0.95657 
t = 54.22, df = 273, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis: True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: [0.94523, 0.9656] 
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Eigenvalue plot of principal components extracted from raw data 
Figure 3: Eigenvalue Plot per Principal Component - Only 1st PC provides meaningful reduction in variance 
 
 
 
